An agent with write access to a CRM, a chat tool, and an HR system is one bad tool call from emailing salaries to a channel. Safety is least-privilege scopes, a hard read/write split, human approval on destructive actions, and an audit log of everything.
Updated Aug 2026 · Grounded in real Forward Deployed Engineer interview loops and written to a senior-engineer editorial bar.
An agent with write access to a CRM, a chat tool, and an HR system is one bad tool call from emailing salaries to a channel. Safety is least-privilege scopes, a hard read/write split, human approval on destructive actions, and an audit log of everything.
The senior signal is designing the MCP server as a policy enforcement point, not a thin passthrough: per-tool least-privilege scopes, read tools separated from write tools, human-in-the-loop approval and dry-run on anything destructive or cross-system, and a complete audit log. Strong candidates treat the agent as untrusted and prevent exfiltration (HR data into a public Slack channel) and accidental overwrite, with reversibility. Watch for candidates who hand the agent a broad admin token, or who trust the model to 'be careful' instead of enforcing limits server-side.
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