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arXiv preprint

Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samples

A tiny fraction of a large training corpus can still contain enough repeated malicious examples to matter. Learn the evidence, threat-model limits and defensive implications.

Breakdown by FDE Interviews · 9 min read · Updated

About the original · 2025
AUTHORS
Souly, Rando, Chapman, Davies et al.
FROM
UK AI Security Institute, Anthropic, Alan Turing Institute, University of Oxford and ETH Zurich
PUBLISHED
Oct 2025 · arXiv preprint
IN THIS BREAKDOWN · 10 SECTIONS

You can read 17% of this breakdown.

01

The paper in one minute

If a training dataset grows enormously while the number of malicious examples stays fixed, their percentage becomes tiny. It is tempting to conclude that their effect must also disappear. This paper tests that assumption rather than treating the fraction as a sufficient risk measure.

The authors train models at several scales while controlling the absolute number of poisoned documents. In the main experiments, a few hundred documents are sufficient to induce a trigger-dependent degradation in generation across the tested model sizes. Larger amounts of clean data do not reliably dilute that learned behavior away.

The headline needs its scope. The full-pretraining experiments concern a particular denial-of-service backdoor and models up to 13 billion parameters. Other experiments examine language switching and fine-tuning. The study does not prove that the same document count can implant any behavior in every frontier model.

For an FDE, the lasting lesson is to track data origin, absolute exposure and conditional behavior. A small contamination percentage and an unchanged average benchmark score are both weak reasons to dismiss a possible training-data problem.

THE IDEA, VISUALLY
A SMALLER FRACTION CAN HIDE THE SAME ABSOLUTE EXPOSURE Synthetic audit example: sample 10,000 records uniformly, without replacement. 10 million records 250 flagged 0.0025% of the corpus 77.87% chance the audit misses all 250 100 million records 250 flagged 0.00025% of the corpus 97.53% chance the audit misses all 250 1 billion records 250 flagged 0.000025% of the corpus 99.75% chance the audit misses all 250 These are sampling probabilities, not model attack-success rates. Source-aware review and behavioral evaluation complement random sampling; none alone proves absence.
Our defensive sampling calculation uses invented corpus sizes and a fixed number of flagged records. It illustrates audit coverage, not the paper's measured model behavior or an attack recipe.
Research notes: the problem, approach and results
250 documents

sufficient in the reported main denial-of-service experiments

600M–13B

model parameter range in full-pretraining experiments

72 models

24 pretraining configurations across three seeds

THE PROBLEM

Poisoning risk can be understated when measured only as a percentage of a growing dataset.

THE IDEA

Hold the absolute number of malicious examples fixed while varying model and clean-data scale.

THE RESULT

The tested backdoor behaviors depend strongly on absolute exposure, with important limits on generalization.

02

Why it matters to an FDE

An enterprise team may fine-tune on support transcripts, contractor annotations or harvested examples. A quality dashboard can report a very low suspicious-record fraction while overlooking repeated examples from one compromised source. The relevant exposure includes how often those records are actually sampled during training.

This paper concerns changes learned into model weights. It is different from prompt injection, where untrusted material influences a running model through its input. Both can affect agents, but the evidence to collect and the remediation steps differ.

Use audit trails to connect a model version to its dataset and training configuration. Preserve a way to identify affected runs and roll back. When assessing a vendor model, ask about data controls and behavioral evaluation without pretending that a downstream application can inspect or certify an unavailable training corpus.

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  • ◇1 architecture diagram
  • </>2 runnable code blocks
  • ▦3 results tables
  1. 03Key takeaways

    Evaluate poisoning evidence without generalizing a narrow attack result too far

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  2. 04How it works

    Follow fixed-count experiments and distinguish full pretraining from continuation studies

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  3. 05The numbers that matter

    Read document counts and model scales without treating them as universal thresholds

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  4. 06Try it yourself

    Calculate why a clean random audit can miss a small fixed set of problematic records

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  5. 07Where it breaks

    Recognize limits on post-training persistence, model scale and ingestion assumptions

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  6. 08Using it on a deployment

    Strengthen data lineage and release checks while preserving a clear incident-response path

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  7. 09Interview angles

    Explain why low contamination percentages and normal benchmark scores can both be misleading

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